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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA	
2	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA	
3	IN RE: : CIVIL ACTION NO.	
4	: 19-6019 WAWA, INC. DATA SECURITY :	
5	LITIGATION : STATUS CONFERENCE :	
6	; ;	
7		
8	James A. Byrne U.S. Courthouse 601 Market Street	
9	Philadelphia, PA 19106 December 5, 2023	
10	Commencing at 3:06 p.m.	
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GENE E.K. PRATTER	
12		
13	APPEARANCES:	
14	FOR THE CONSUMER BERGER MONTAGUE, PC	
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25	Proceedings taken stenographically and prepared utilizing computer-aided transcription	
	United States District Court	

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25		
	United	States District Court

1	ALSO PRESENT:
2	CHRISTIAN LEVIS, ESQUIRE LOWEY DANNENBERG, PC
3 4	GARY F. LYNCH, ESQUIRE LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
5	JEANNINE M. KENNEY, ESQUIRE HAUSFELD, LLP
6 7	MINDEE J. REUBEN, ESQUIRE LITE DePALMA GREENBERG & AFANADOR, LLC
8	THEODORE F. FRANK, OBJECTOR
9	
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             (Call to order of the court.)
 2
             THE COURT: Hi, everybody. Take your seats. Good
 3
    afternoon.
 4
           All right. This is a gathering in the consumer track
    case in the In Re Wawa Data Security Litigation docketed
 6
    19-6019. Let's start out by taking attendance.
 7
             MR. JOHNS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ben Johns for
 8
    the consumer plaintiffs.
 9
             MS. NUSSBAUM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Linda
10
    Nussbaum for the consumer plaintiffs.
11
             MS. LIEBENBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Bobbi
12
    Liebenberg for the consumer plaintiffs.
1.3
             MS. SAVETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Sherrie
14
    Savett for the consumer plaintiffs.
15
             MR. PARKS: Hello, Your Honor. Greg Parks, Morgan
16
    Lewis, for defendant Wawa, Inc.
17
             MR. SCHULMAN: Good afternoon. Adam Schulman for
18
    objector Theodore Frank, and, per the Court's instructions, I
19
    have Mr. Frank with me.
20
             THE COURT: Great. Welcome.
21
           Anybody else want to get their presence noted here?
22
             MR. LYNCH: Hi, Your Honor. Gary Lynch for the
23
    financial institution plaintiffs. It sounds like you called
24
    the consumer case first.
25
             THE COURT: Everybody is welcome.
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             MR. LYNCH: We're here.
 2
             MS. REUBEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mindee
 3
    Reuben for the financial institutions.
 4
             THE COURT: Nice to see you.
 5
             MS. REUBEN: Nice to see you, Your Honor.
 6
             THE COURT: It's nice to see everybody. I haven't
 7
    seen Ms. Reuben for a while.
 8
             MS. KENNEY: Hello, Your Honor. Jeannine Kenney for
 9
    the financial institutions.
10
             MR. LEVIS: And Christian Levis for the financial
11
    institutions.
12
             THE COURT: Anybody else?
1.3
           Anybody here from the Third Circuit? Just want to know.
14
    Anybody willing to disclose themselves?
15
           I thought over and over again about what we're going to
16
    do here today, and I frankly don't know that I've come up with
17
    anything particularly insightful, so I think I will start out
18
    by asking Mr. Frank's attorney what he believes is accomplished
19
    and what do you think we need to do.
20
             MR. SCHULMAN: Your Honor, would you like me to --
21
             THE COURT: Whatever you think is appropriate.
22
             MR. SCHULMAN: I'm happy to approach the podium.
23
             THE COURT: If you are happy, I'll be happy.
24
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, we think that with the vacation
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    of the fee award, under the terms of the settlement, the
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    settlement for the consumer track is still in place. Because
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    of the third amendment, we withdrew our objection to the
 3
    settlement itself. The Third Circuit vacated this Court's fee
    award for reconsideration of the reasonableness in light of the
    amounts actually claimed by the class. That's how we read the
 6
    opinion.
 7
           We're happy to brief further for Your Honor if you wish
 8
    to do that. We had a call last week with the class counsel
 9
    and --
10
             THE COURT: Do you think they are standing too far
11
    apart or too close together?
12
             MR. SCHULMAN: The class counsel?
1.3
             THE COURT: And the defense counsel.
14
             MR. SCHULMAN: In terms of --
15
             THE COURT: We don't want any collusion here, do we?
16
             MR. SCHULMAN: We didn't use the word "collusion" in
17
    our briefing. It's public record. We never used the word
18
    "collusion." It's conflict of interest.
19
             THE COURT: What do you think the conflict is? I
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    really am serious when I say I want to know what it is, because
21
    I truly think all of the appropriate considerations were
22
    addressed, some that didn't even make it into the Third Circuit
23
    opinion, and so I'm curious to know what it is we next ought to
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    do from your perspective.
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             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, I think there's two main
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considerations. I would put them in two large buckets first. The Third Circuit obviously was somewhat concerned with the fact that this Court --THE COURT: The panel. MR. SCHULMAN: The Third Circuit panel, right, was somewhat concerned with the fact that this Court had concluded that the constructive common fund was the full amount made available even though less than that was claimed. That's number one. Number two, it seemed concerned about the clear sailing and kicker provisions of the settlement. And as we argued before, Your Honor ruled that the fact that they removed the kicker provision was, in fact, a welcome change, as the Third Circuit said, but it did go to the quality and efficiency of the representation. THE COURT: Let me ask. This is part of the practical issue that I see. How many things that are discussed in negotiating a settlement must either be disclosed or confessed? Those of you who might have experienced confession in your youth might recognize this concept. But there are things that are negotiated that are then negotiated out of a deal, and yet what I read in this opinion is all of that must be confessed in order to know what the net result is. I don't quite understand how that works. How do you envision that? MR. SCHULMAN: Well, I think part of it is the

attorney fee award is a fundamental component of the class action settlement proceeding. That's why you see the paragraphs that the panel spent walking through the history of 23(h) and the equitable practice before that.

THE COURT: For example, let's say in negotiating any case, it doesn't matter whether it's a rear-end collision or something like this or, you know, price fixing of eggs, just to give some acknowledgement, there are many things discussed and rejected in negotiating, and yet, according this opinion, all of that has to be flyspecked in order to see what has legitimately been negotiated out of a deal. How does that work?

MR. SCHULMAN: Well, I don't think that its the best interpretation of the opinion. I don't think that it's -- I think that the opinion, as long as there is arm's length negotiation, you can trust the parties to get to the right --

THE COURT: I can't trust the parties with anything here according to this.

By the way, I meant to mention Judge Welsh says hello to everybody.

MR. SCHULMAN: Well, I don't think that the decision casts doubt on the total amount that was reached. The arm's length negotiation ensures that the total sum, the 6.2 million constructive common fund, is an adequate amount, but the inherent conflict of interest is why the Court needs to look

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    into the allegation --
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             THE COURT: What's the conflict of interest?
 3
             MR. SCHULMAN: It's the principal agent conflict
    between class counsel and their clients, the class members.
    Because every dollar the defendant is willing to put up has to
 6
    go --
 7
             THE COURT: How do you know that?
 8
             MR. SCHULMAN: That's just an -- you know, it's the
 9
    economic reality that Judge Becker has talked about in --
10
             THE COURT: You are speaking of the dollars as
11
    fungible.
12
             MR. SCHULMAN: Right.
13
             THE COURT: Maybe the dollars are not fungible. Maybe
14
    when there is principle involved, l-e, not everything is
15
    principal, a-1. Or the reverse, perhaps.
16
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, here I would say that's not the
17
    case because Wawa agreed to get rid of fee segregation. We
18
    showed that every dollar made available they were willing to
19
    give to the class when they removed the reversion in our Third
20
    Amended Settlement.
21
             THE COURT: How do you know that?
22
             MR. SCHULMAN: I mean, that's just -- because they
23
    were willing to do it.
24
             THE COURT: How do you know that?
25
             MR. SCHULMAN: I mean, what do you mean how do I know
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that? They agreed to it. We stipulated to it. It's on the
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 2
    docket, Your Honor, that they, you know, settled. So for them
 3
    the amount, you know, that's -- if Your Honor wants to make a
    finding otherwise --
 5
             THE COURT: No, no. What I truly want is what you
 6
    think is the roadmap now.
 7
             MR. SCHULMAN: Oh, what we do now. Well, we can
    submit further briefs if Your Honor --
 8
 9
             THE COURT: The last thing I need is further briefs.
10
             MR. SCHULMAN: I mean, we have had some
11
    correspondence --
12
             THE COURT: I want a practical roadmap.
13
             MR. SCHULMAN: We've had some correspondence about
14
    whether there could be a negotiated resolution between what we
15
    think is the reasonable fee -- we suggested in our last filing
16
    of 25 percent -- and what they suggested of the full 3 million,
17
    3-point-some-odd million.
18
             THE COURT: What do you do with the value of the
19
    injunctive relief, which, of course, there is no reference to
20
    in this Third Circuit opinion? Which astonishes me, frankly.
21
             MR. SCHULMAN: So the value of the injunctive relief,
22
    under precedent, can go to award 30 percent rather than
23
    25 percent.
24
             THE COURT: Where is that formula?
25
             MR. SCHULMAN: Staton v. Boeing is the case that --
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             THE COURT: And therefore what?
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             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, I don't want to reveal our
 3
    settlement negotiations with chance counsel --
 4
             THE COURT: Everybody is supposed to reveal their
 5
    negotiations according to this. Nothing is off-limits anymore,
           I need a full list of everything you all have discussed
 6
 7
    and the resolution of it in order to be satisfied that there is
    no collusion. How do I know there's no collusion with you?
 9
             MR. SCHULMAN: So I think they used the word
10
    "collusion," but I think that was shorthand for this
11
    conflict-of-interest problem.
12
             THE COURT: It's fairly short shrift, is it not?
13
             MR. SCHULMAN: Yeah, it's really a semantic problem.
14
    We've seen other courts use the word "collusion" when I don't
15
    really think that they are talking about --
16
             THE COURT: Not in my cases. I went through a very
17
    thorough review here, and I want to now what do we do.
18
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, we are not asking for discovery
19
    into those negotiations, if that's what you are getting at.
20
             THE COURT: I'm not getting at anything. I want to
21
    know what you are getting at.
22
             MR. SCHULMAN: I mean, maybe it would help you to hear
23
    where the plaintiffs' stand on the question of -- because we've
24
    proposed them an offer what we think would be a fair
25
    resolution, and I haven't heard back from them.
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           But we're happy to brief the question further.
 2
    didn't ask for discovery of the negotiations. We take --
 3
             THE COURT: If you were going to brief something, what
 4
    is it, pray tell, would you be briefing?
 5
             MR. SCHULMAN: The impact of the Third Circuit's
 6
    decision --
 7
             THE COURT: That's why we're here today.
 8
             MR. SCHULMAN: -- on the award of fees.
 9
             THE COURT: That's why we are here.
10
           I think your client is speaking to you.
11
             MR. SCHULMAN: Do you want to ask the Court?
12
           He's more than competent for you to address him.
13
             THE COURT: No. I literally want to know what you and
14
    the other lawyers have discerned we're supposed to do now.
15
    Because for sure I have every confidence that this was a
16
    properly negotiated result. I have every confidence that the
17
    lawyers involved in this case have to a person been honorable,
18
    forthcoming, and respectful of their clients' interests.
19
           I want to know, in truth and in good faith, what it is
20
    that you actually think is supposed to be done. Am I supposed
21
    to bring everybody up here and make them swear that they didn't
2.2
    collude?
23
                           No. I really do think that was just
             MR. SCHULMAN:
24
    semantic shorthand for the issue of considering these conflict
25
    of interests, the fact --
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             THE COURT: What are the conflicts? I still don't
 2
    know.
 3
             MR. SCHULMAN: The inclusion of the clear sailing and
    kicker provision in the initial settlement. Those serve class
    counsels' interests --
 6
             THE COURT: If those words were ever used, how can
 7
    they be taken back? That's what's so difficult.
 8
             MR. SCHULMAN: You mean the "collusion" word, Your
 9
    Honor?
10
             THE COURT: The clear sailing. Okay, talk about
11
    shorthand, that is a shorthand term. And if that was ever
12
    used, that can't be returned from the atmosphere, can it? So
13
    now what I do with that?
14
             MR. SCHULMAN: In our view, that bears on the quality
15
    of the representation. The efficiency of the representation
16
    needs to be taken into account at the fee-setting stage.
17
             THE COURT: How do I do that, that I haven't already
18
    done, or that Judge Welsh hasn't already done?
19
             MR. SCHULMAN: I don't know if Judge Welsh considered
20
    what was a reasonable fee. I don't recall Judge Welsh stating
21
    that she did.
22
             THE COURT: Well, I'm pretty sure she was involved in
23
    the overall negotiating of the settlement.
24
             MR. SCHULMAN: That's fair. And our position would be
25
    that --
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             THE COURT: I'm glad that's fair.
 2
             MR. SCHULMAN: -- it's a nondelegable duty of this
 3
    Court to review fees. I think that Third Circuit opinion is
    clear at least on that much.
 5
             THE COURT: So other than you briefing something, what
 6
    else do you think needs to be done?
 7
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, like I said, we had
 8
    correspondence with class counsel.
 9
             THE COURT: Well, you don't need me for you to talk to
10
    them about what you want them to respond to.
11
             MR. SCHULMAN: I agree with that, and I didn't ask for
12
    you to hold this hearing, so we're here and I brought my client
13
    per the Court's request.
14
             THE COURT: Well, you are the operating party here.
15
    It's his appeal and you are his spokesperson.
16
             MR. SCHULMAN: Yes.
17
             THE COURT: So as I understand it, given the fact that
18
    we're in football season, you are lateraling to the plaintiffs'
19
    lawyers. You want me to talk to them now.
20
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, you can ask them what their
21
    position is. We did correspond with them about a potential
22
    briefing schedule, if Your Honor wants briefing.
23
             THE COURT: How many times have I said I wanted
24
    briefing?
25
             MR. SCHULMAN: None. We were not -- nobody was aware
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1
    of what you were going to ask for, so we were just being
 2
    prepared.
 3
             THE COURT: All right. Why don't you take a seat.
 4
           Anybody else want to offer any perspectives?
 5
             MS. SAVETT: May I, Your Honor?
 6
             THE COURT: Sure.
 7
           What do you think I should be doing?
 8
             MS. SAVETT: We think that Mr. Schulman has completely
 9
    misconstrued what the Third Circuit said. The Third Circuit
10
    instructed the Court to consider two issues on remand.
11
    first one is --
12
             THE COURT: Reasonableness of the fee award and
13
    apportionment of the benefit and the presence of side
14
    agreements. Those are two things.
15
             MS. SAVETT: That's right. Thank you.
16
             THE COURT: I thought I had done both of those things,
17
    so what am I supposed to do now?
18
             MS. SAVETT: We thought so, too. But the Third
19
    Circuit remanded it for a more fully developed factual record
20
    with respect to the alleged or purported clear sailing and
21
    reverter issues, and we can provide that, but we want to give
22
    you a short outline of what we're going to say.
23
           Our proposal is to submit declarations dealing with the
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    purported clear sailing and reverter issues, which we think
25
    neither was present.
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THE COURT: This is the confessional part.

MS. SAVETT: The Court of Appeals -- and another misconstruction, we believe, of Mr. Schulman is that the Court of Appeals repeatedly emphasized that the determination of reasonableness of the fee award is within the Trial Court's discretion. They said it at least four times: on pages 10, 16, 21, and 19. And the Court rejected objector's argument for the adoption of a per se rule for the reasonableness of a fee award that it should be based solely on the amounts claimed by class members. And, in fact, it was briefed greatly, and Your Honor considered it all, but the Third Circuit law is very clear that the opposite is usually accepted in the Third Circuit, which is that you look at what was offered to the class, not just what was claimed. But he beliefs that -- he stated that the Court made a per se rule that you can only look at the claims that were actually made, and that's just not what the Court said at all. The Court said that -- and I'm quoting from the opinion of the Third Circuit -- Courts can evaluate the reasonableness of a percentage-based award by reference to either amounts paid or amounts made available.

So this Court has discretion to decide what is the proper way to look at reasonableness, between those two options. And the offers that have been made to us are only based on the option of counting the claims that were made, and they are not acceptable to us.

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The Court also stressed the determination of which approach to use remains with the District Court, at page 19. And as Your Honor just pointed out, the injunctive relief is particularly valuable here because many of Wawa's customers are repeat loyal customers --THE COURT: One of the things I find -- well, I quess the Third Circuit's words were they found things bewildering. One of the things that I am bewildered by, having spent many years, actually, working on the rules committee where we talked about revising Rule 23, both to deal with objectors and what to do with objectors and the so-called holdups there, but also valuing the concept of settlement classes and valuing injunctive relief. There are many, and I know I'm not telling you now, but I am telling somebody, that there are many class actions that focus principally on injunctive relief, many, and they are valuable, and they only come about as a result of hard work by lawyers on both sides. MS. SAVETT: Well, we appreciate that so much that you said it, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's what bewilders me. MS. SAVETT: We hired an expert to help us to analyze what was wrong with their system, how they could improve it, how it could be supervised in the future. This was a major benefit. And you said it better than I can say it. I want to just read your words from the preliminary approval decision on

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this point. You said: The settlement provides class members
    with an immediate tangible benefit in the form of a Wawa gift
    card and, in addition, to improve security when using a payment
    card at Wawa. I mean, that was one of the most significant
    parts of the settlement.
             THE COURT: In fairness, I do understand why gift
    cards are a little bit of a --
             MS. SAVETT: They are not exactly cash, but they --
             THE COURT: People get excited by gift cards. I
    understand that. I'm really focused on the practices that were
    put into place.
             MS. SAVETT: And also the fact that we had it as a
    mandate in the settlement that there were going to be audits
14
    and that they had to be enforced for two years.
             THE COURT: If I were to go through this -- these
16
    machinations and create a formula, what would you be giving me
    in the terms of what you or Wawa's counsel are giving me to
    plug into the formula to value the injunctive relief?
             MS. SAVETT: Not everything can be done by a
    mathematical formula. And the idea that every single Wawa
    customer, and mostly repeat customers who are in our class, is
    going to go to the gas station or buy their goods and not be
    afraid that their card will be stolen, it clearly has a value.
           And then you have to look at it in light of all of the
    other reasonableness factors, which you did look at. I mean,
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you looked at the percentage, you looked at what was offered, you looked at what was the claims rate compared to other data breach cases. You did a very, very thorough analysis of reasonableness.

THE COURT: So what am I supposed to do now?

MS. SAVETT: Well, I think, for one thing, you have the discretion. And that's clear. And you have your choice of what you think is the better way to look at the benefit here.

Is it by what was offered to the class or what was claimed?

And then on the last point, Bobbi Liebenberg is going to address these purported side agreements and reverters which don't even exist and never did, but just putting --

THE COURT: But now you got to pretend they did, so now you have to confess them.

MS. SAVETT: I don't have anything to confess, because the agreement was absolutely silent -- I don't want to take away Bobbi's argument, but it didn't say anything about a reverter to the defendant's counsel, at all. And so I will let Bobbi handle those issues.

But I want to get back to your question about what should be the formula and what should we do now. So, first of all, you have to clear away the dust about the so-called side agreements and reverters. But then, looking at the valuation of the settlement, you look at all the reasonableness factors, most of which you already looked at. But one of them that the

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    courts didn't even consider in the Third Circuit is any value
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    to the injunctive relief.
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             THE COURT: That's why I asked. How do I value that?
    How do I plug that into the formula?
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             MS. SAVETT: I think you plug it in just by common
            That there were hundreds of thousands of Wawa customers
 6
 7
    in that class -- there were 22 million, actually -- and most of
    them go back to Wawa all the time and they don't have to worry
 9
    about their card experiencing a fraud because Wawa really,
10
    really had to make major changes, $35 million of changes. And
11
    the other factor that is really important about our settlement
12
    is we made it enforceable by the Court. For two years there
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    will be audits and they have to ensure in writing that they
14
    complied and that they test their procedures and it's still
15
    working well to protect consumers.
16
           Now, I can't give you a number how you evaluate that,
17
    but it's clearly a benefit.
18
             THE COURT: Maybe Wawa could tell me what it cost them
19
    to put all this in place.
20
             MS. SAVETT: Well, we know that. That's in the
21
    record. $35 million.
22
             THE COURT: Well, it is apparently not in the record
23
    clear enough.
24
             MS. SAVETT: Well, we can certainly put in some
25
    further declarations on that.
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             THE COURT: I thought it was clear, but --
             MS. SAVETT: I thought that it was actually in the
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 3
    papers about the 35 million. But we can put in factual
    declarations that would support all the benefits of the
    injunctive relief. That's one step that I think that we could
 6
    take concretely.
 7
             THE COURT: Well, it occurs to me, although this may
 8
    sound facetious, but one of the things I was thinking of is
 9
    assigning you each a different century to research.
10
             MS. SAVETT: Please don't do that.
11
             THE COURT: Well, I was going to ask you, which
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    century would you like, the 12th century or the 14th or the
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    18th?
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             MS. SAVETT: I don't think you expect an answer to
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    that.
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             THE COURT: Well, it seems to be an interesting topic
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    to consider.
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             MS. SAVETT: By the way, one other factor when you did
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    your reasonableness analysis, and I think you already did it so
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    thoroughly, is the fact that we, as lead counsel, who worked
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    very hard on this case, gave up 25 percent of our time when we
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    even made the application, and we were still negative by
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    point -- negative 78 percent, and now with two more years since
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    the settlement and appeal and everything else, it's super
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    negative, probably down to minus 50 percent.
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THE COURT: That part I don't know.

MS. SAVETT: But those are facts that we can say.

And I do think it's important for my colleague Bobbi
Liebenberg to go through each one of these two accusations
about a purported side agreement and a reverter, or more
nefariously, as Mr. Schulman puts it, a kicker, none of which
existed. So I would like to yield to my colleague Bobbi.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: Not to suggest anything -- I mean, I understand, I respect the notion that everybody has got an axe to grind here, but I am earnest in saying that I truly do not know what is missing from the evaluation of this record, because of my routine. I mean, not to mean that I'm only a routine follower, but this is pretty straightforward as an evaluation, and I don't think there was anything material that was missed. And so I am earnestly asking what anybody thinks needs to be done now. Not make work, not, you know, just for fun, not looking for evilness that doesn't exist. I have seen nothing in this case to make me think that this wasn't an honorable, hard-fought resolution of a case. Perhaps you should have been fighting longer, perhaps we shouldn't have ended this as quickly as we did, perhaps it should not have been as economical as it was, perhaps it should not have been as efficient, and then perhaps it wouldn't have been -- the result wouldn't have been vacated. I honestly don't know. So

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I want to know your best efforts, all counsel, of what needs to
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    be done now.
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             MS. LIEBENBERG: I absolutely agree, Your Honor.
                                                               One
    thing we would want, I will tell you, is that we need a
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    finding --
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             THE COURT: That is probably the safest thing, to tell
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    me you agree with me. I do really want to know.
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             MS. LIEBENBERG: I can tell you in terms of what we
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    know, and that is a finding that there was no side agreements,
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    that there was no collusion, because there was none.
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    negotiation of the settlement was hard-fought, it was in good
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    faith, it was done under the auspices of Magistrate Judge
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    Welsh. We were glad to hear Mr. Schulman say they are not
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    arquing that there was no collusion, but with respect --
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             THE COURT: They are not arguing there wasn't
16
    collusion.
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             MS. LIEBENBERG: Yes, that they are arguing there was
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    collusion.
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           With respect to the purported clear sailing agreement,
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    we think it's important to really look at the paragraph 78 of
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    that agreement, because, in fact, it is not a clear sailing
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    agreement if you look at the language. All paragraph 78
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    required was that Wawa shall cooperate with class counsel, if
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    and as necessary, in providing information class counsel may
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    reasonably request from Wawa in connection with preparing the
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petition. There is no language in paragraph 78 where Wawa agrees that it would not contest the fee, that it would not object to the fee, and it's not even within the definition of a clear sailing agreement as defined by the Third Circuit in its own opinion at pages 7 to 8 at Note 3 where it says: A clear sailing agreement in a class action settlement means defendants agree not to contest class counsel's request for attorney's fees up to an agreed amount.

THE COURT: Where did that come from?

MS. LIEBENBERG: I'm not sure, Your Honor. If you look at that paragraph, and we can do findings of fact that make that very clear, paragraph 78 was merely a cooperation provision that was intended to require Wawa to provide information concerning the scope and the value of the relief, including the value of the injunctive relief.

THE COURT: One of the things that I find bewildering about what to do now is -- and lawyers who work with me fairly frequently know that I am by no means a, you know, a devoted -- a devotee of settlements. I'd rather have trial, frankly. But the idea -- those people who do like settlements want there to be cooperation. They want to eliminate controversy. They want to eliminate more fighting. So I find there to be some disconnect, and that's why I'm befuddled and bewildered -- sounds like a song, an old song.

Are we supposed to reserve more acrimony as part of a,

quote, settlement? It's a peculiar irony.

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MS. LIEBENBERG: I agree, Your Honor. But what's interesting, if you look at what happened in this case, counsel for Wawa did provide cooperation in terms of giving us information that was relevant to the reasonableness of the fee. Mr. Parks provided a declaration with respect to the injunction component, which is what Ms. Savett was referring to, in terms of why these enhanced security features were particularly important for a repeat customer base, and that was additional information that counsel for Wawa provided with respect to, yes, the value of the gift cards, the fact that within the last two years gift cards had a 97 percent usage rate, the number of products that could be purchased for five dollars or less. That was information that all went to the reasonableness of the fee, and that was consistent with paragraph 78, which, as I said, was a cooperation provision. It was not -- you can There is no language in paragraph 78 where Wawa said it would not object or that it would not contest the fee.

And then turning to the so-called kicker, I think this is another area where we would like a strong finding, because it is important to emphasize that the parties did not intend, we didn't discuss, we didn't agree that there would be a reversion of the fees if the Court didn't award the full amount.

THE COURT: The weird thing here is, I'm trying to

envision a settlement, either a preliminary hearing or a final settlement approval, where I have a laundry list to go through and force people to say they did not discuss everything.

MS. LIEBENBERG: Right.

THE COURT: It's a peculiar vision that seems to be out there. That's why I say earnestly I want to know what you all think needs to be done now in order to have a settlement that is -- where the filigree is acrimony.

MS. LIEBENBERG: I'm not sure, Your Honor, to respond to the Third Circuit analysis, but it seems to me that it is clear, that, you know, we can provide these types of findings that would, if, in fact -- hopefully there is never another appeal -- it went up again, that the Third Circuit would have record to show, yes, there were no side agreements.

THE COURT: It seems to me that the issue here is the only way you all will know -- it doesn't matter to me whether there's an appeal or not. I've got work to do one way or another -- but the only way you are all going to know that is if you reduce your fee. I mean, that -- that -- not to be too practical about it, but that seems to be where the rubber meets the road.

MS. LIEBENBERG: Well, Your Honor, we believe you still have the discretion to go back and review this, and we believe those factors still support the original fee and certainly not what is contemplated by Mr. Frank.

THE COURT: I mean, he's entitled. He's a class member. He can object, you know, as long as it's within the rules and Rule 23 and whatever additions, changes that have been made to that. Although it is, just as a matter of interest, it was the attention of a very large collection of people to evaluate -- I don't want to be pejorative about this -- to evaluate demands being made by objectors as a way of pacifying objectors to allow for settlements to go forward in class actions. That is another irony. It doesn't belong in this case, of course. I'm not suggesting that's what happened here, nor am I suggesting there was any collusion among counsel in this case. I think everybody is as clean as the driven snow here, should we have snow here this winter.

All right. So what you are suggesting, Ms. Liebenberg, is that each of the lawyers would sign an oath that they did not engage in any untoward discussion with each other, that you harbored no evil thoughts, that you had no discussions, that you didn't exchange tit for tat or whatever. I have no formula for --

MS. LIEBENBERG: I think that's important. And I think it's also important, as Ms. Savett alluded to, paragraph 77 of the earlier version of the settlement agreement was merely a factual recitation that we were going to put in a fee petition, we were going to ask for service awards, we were going to ask for expenses. It never addressed what would

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happen if the Court awarded less. The agreement was silent.
    And so because the agreement was silent, it was later -- it was
    later clarified in the Third Amended Settlement Agreement to
    explicitly provide that if the Court awarded less than the
    3.2 million those funds would go to Tier 1, Tier 2 class
    members who were getting gift cards.
             THE COURT: What you're saying is there is no
    assurance that that's what would happen at all.
             MS. LIEBENBERG: It was silent prior, in the earlier
    version. But I think it's also important that in the
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    objector's two briefs in the Third Circuit and in the brief
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    before this Court, after the Third Amended Settlement Agreement
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    was executed, there was no argument made that the Third Amended
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    Settlement Agreement was a product of collusion because in a
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    prior version the prior paragraph 77 existed. You know, there
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    is -- somehow the Third Circuit wanted, as you said, to look
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    back and see whether or not that somehow tainted the agreement.
             THE COURT: Well, to think about how to do that.
             MS. LIEBENBERG: Yes. Well, there was none and
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    they've never raised it. It was never raised on appeal.
           So we do think that there are some issues that can be
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    clarified by declarations, and we do believe the Court has
    discretion to review the fee and I think, again, amplifying the
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    record, you know, all of the factors that the Court considered
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    properly in determining that fee.
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THE COURT: Have you and the objector's counsel
discussed the substance or the topics that should be addressed?
I don't want to hear about dollar amounts. That's frankly too
crass, because I don't know what the right dollar amount is. I
know what the right material terms are. I know what the right
qualitative, but I haven't heard from anybody here how I turn
qualitative into quantitative.
        MS. LIEBENBERG: No, we have not discussed what the
formula would be to look at that. We did discuss some of these
issues with respect to our sort of anger about this issue about
that there were -- you know, that it's been characterized as
side agreements, to tell you the truth.
         THE COURT: Well, according to Mr. Schulman, those
were just the Court of Appeals' unfortunate use of terms.
         MS. LIEBENBERG: We took it pretty personally.
         THE COURT: Well, yes. I can't speak for them.
         MS. LIEBENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Wawa's
counsel. I don't want to keep you from enjoying this.
         MR. PARKS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Greg Parks
for Wawa.
       Wawa actually does not have an axe to grind here.
                                                         We
don't have a lot at stake on this because the award of
attorney's fees comes out of our pocket, those dollars don't
come back -- I'm sorry. What's that?
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1 THE COURT: You were not a colluder? 2 MR. PARKS: We were definitely not a colluder, Your 3 Honor, and happy to put in some facts to that effect, but I am counsel of record in this case and do have an interest in moving it forward. 6 So, like you, I have read and reread the Third Circuit's 7 opinion to try to figure out exactly the question you've asked, which is, now what? And I think from my perspective the "now 9 what " is two pieces, as we've all kind of acknowledged. 10 first piece is looking at the amount of the fee award relative 11 to either the amount claimed or the amount made available and 12 to make it clearer, although I think your original opinion was 13 pretty clear on this point, but I think the Third Circuit 14 disagreed and felt like you thought you were constrained to 15 only look at the amount made available and you didn't think you 16 were allowed to look at the amount claimed. And I think a 17 revised opinion from this Court could make it clear that there 18 were a number of factors that caused Your Honor to decide --19 THE COURT: I always have to say -- I'm not normally 20 accused of being sheepish. 21 MR. PARKS: No, I wouldn't have thought. 22 So but I think you could say there are a number of 23 factors that caused Your Honor to decide to look at the amount 24 made available, and those factors could include things like the 25 injunctive relief. So I think as you struggle with how do I

value that \$35 million --

THE COURT: This is my frustration. The injunctive relief was considered initially and it appears nowhere in the circuit opinion.

MR. PARKS: I agree. It should have gotten more weight in the analysis.

THE COURT: It has value. It has tremendous value.

MR. PARKS: And Wawa agrees and Wawa believed that was an important thing to do for our customers and an important part of the settlement. And I will vouch for the plaintiffs' lawyers, especially Mr. Ben Johns there, has hounded Wawa and me about getting all of the reports and the audits and the compliance statements and the affidavits and everything else that are called for in that settlement agreement. I can set my watch to the fact that Ben Johns will send me a reminder to get those things to him on time. So they've been very vigorous about that, and I think that's part of the reason why Your Honor can say, "I looked at the amounts made available."

In addition, I think it's appropriate, and the Third Circuit opinion sort of hints at this, that in exercising your discretion you can look at facts that are specific to this case. And the facts that are specific to this case is this is a data breach case, meaning that information got out. And for some people that might have meant something bad happened, a fraudulent charge appeared on their credit card --

THE COURT: This is why you have tiers.

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MR. PARKS: This is why there are tiers. But I think it's also a factor in determining that because so many people were not harmed, the class counsel, what they really need to do was protect against the possibility that way more people that Wawa said were harmed were in fact harmed, and so they made available a larger amount of money in case that's the fact. And having done that, I think they deserve the credit for having made available that larger sum of money to kind of force Wawa to put its money where its mouth is. That we said, look, we don't think a lot of people were hurt here, but we are willing to put that forward and say if more people were hurt, it's going to cost us more money, we're going to have to send out more gift cards, we're going to have to do more things, and they put us to our paces on that. So I think that's where it's fair to consider the amounts made available rather than just the amounts claimed. And I think if Your Honor were to say on remand, "in my discretion, that's what I've decided to do," I think that would make it fairly unappealable, bulletproof, which I think is all in our best interest.

The second issue is then these so-called side agreements, which I agree with plaintiffs' lawyers that they were not side agreements. The Third Circuit characterized them that way, so we'll live with that. But I think if you then set that aside for a second and say, all right --

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THE COURT: The practical question I have, this is not the last settlement that's ever going to happen either for you lawyers or for me or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or the Third Circuit or Mr. Frank. What do you do with the next one? How do you guard against -- how do you prove a negative? MR. PARKS: And you are right. You'd have to have a check list of 47 or many more things. But I think the way I read the panel's opinion here is when you have a case where an objector has pointed to a thing and said that's a clear sailing provision or that's a reverter or kicker, whatever label they want to call it, the Court has an obligation to go look at that and say, all right, let me scratch beneath the surface and peel the onion back a little bit and get at that. I think Your Honor's initial opinion did that, because you did talk about the reverter and it's gone now, and you did talk about the so-called clear sailing provision. But what I think the Third Circuit has said now is explore how those things arrived, what purpose they served, and whether their presence, even temporary, suggests coordinated rather than zealous advocacy. That's the language the Third Circuit closes with. THE COURT: That's the part that I find a bit puzzling. Do I have to find out if -- how does one find out, how does a district court judge find out whether somebody's got a piece of dust in their eye or they are winking? MR. PARKS: Right. I think those are the challenges

1 district court judges have all the time, right, is making 2 factual findings. 3 THE COURT: Precisely. And is there yet another test 4 for that? 5 MR. PARKS: No. I think if the Court were to take 6 declarations, on which would could do a little bit more to help 7 you with those questions, the exact things that the Third Circuit suggested you want to look into, you can then make 9 findings, very similar to what you've said in this courtroom 10 today, that you believe this was honest, hardworking, 11 clean-as-the-driven-snow people on both sides not colluding and 12 working hard to come to a settlement zealously advocating for 13 their clients, I think you'll find that to be the case. And I 14 think we can put in front of you things like when we were 15 negotiating this settlement and the plaintiffs' lawyers had 16 gotten us to agree to the amount that we were going to make 17 available to the class and to agree to the injunctive relief 18 and to agree to the evaluation of the injunctive relief at 19 \$35 million. So I'm looking at \$35 million plus another 20 \$9 million. I'm looking at possibly \$44 million that the 21 plaintiffs' lawyers could say this is the value we created for 22 the class. And when we were negotiating attorney's fees, I was 23 frankly really worried they were going to ask for much more. 24 was worried that they were going to ask for \$10 million on a 25 \$44 million total fund. So when we negotiated them down and

they agreed to a cap of 3.2, I thought we had done a really good job, we had gotten a good result for Wawa, a good result for the class, and I thought 3.2 was actually a really low number. And then they actually told us as part of the negotiations that that was almost a negative lodestar, that they were pretty much at that dollar amount in the time and effort that they had into the case, and then I was really worried. So I really felt like the 3.2 was a good number.

I will tell you honestly, I didn't think for a second there was a chance that the amount awarded would be less than 3.2, so that's why we didn't put a provision in to that effect. We didn't address what would happen if the Court decided some number less than 3.2 was appropriate. And those are the sort of things we can put in declarations.

How we deal with that in future settlements, I think you have to kind of look at what an objector brings to the table. If an objector brings to the table, hey, here is a clear sailing, here is a reverter, here's a kicker, then there are certain kind of buzz words that the District Court has to say, all right, I guess I got to ask look into that, I got to ask for declarations, I got to ask for, you know, how did that little thing arrive or what did you negotiate, and I think that's not too abnormal. I think class counsel negotiating settlement agreements often find themselves in front of the Court on preliminary approval and final approval explaining

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    exactly those kind of things: Here was the negotiation. Here
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    was the back-and-forth. Here is why we settled on a
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    five-dollar gift card. That was product of back-and-forth
    negotiation.
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             THE COURT: Again, my frustration here is I have some
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    distinct recollection of doing all this.
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             MR. PARKS: Absolutely, Your Honor. I agree, and
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    sometimes you just need to do it again to show the teacher your
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    homework, I quess.
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           Happy to address anything else, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: No.
                              I would like -- I still am in search
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    of a roadmap. Maybe Mr. Frank's counsel has come up with
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    something of what it is you all are supposed to now put on
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    paper.
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             MR. PARKS: Yeah, I think what we had discussed
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    amongst ourselves, and subject to the Court's approval, and
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    I've heard Your Honor very clearly that you are not
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    particularly excited about getting more briefs, but I think --
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             THE COURT: What would you brief?
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             MR. PARKS: I think we would say, all right, in light
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    of the Third Circuit's opinion, you can now either consider the
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    amounts claimed or the amounts made available, and here is how
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    you ought to exercise that discretion, and here is what we
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    think about that. I think we can brief that, and we can also
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    put in declarations that address these -- explore how the
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reversion and the kicker and the clear sailing, how those
provisions arrived, what purpose they served, and whether the
presence, even temporary, suggests coordinated rather than
zealous advocacy, we can put in declarations that can make that
easier for Your Honor than we have made that in the past. And
I think we were talking about doing that in about two weeks and
then exchanging responses to those things about a month later
was our thought and proposal what we talked about amongst
counsel, but of course --
         THE COURT: Philosophically, though, I have two minds
in this particular case. Number one, I would like you all to
be able to put a lid on this case and finish it. I'm sure
that's in everybody's interest. But I have also a
philosophical concern about going forward and -- I don't like
unnecessary -- I think it's bad for the profession, I think
it's bad for the community to force acrimony, and that's one of
my big problems here is when I look at this from the
30,000-foot angle or height, that what I walk away with is the
notion that there has got to be more fighting and more evidence
of fighting, and I don't see how we get around that and have a
civilized judicial system.
         MR. PARKS: I agree with that, Your Honor, especially
in a settlement context where the theory --
         THE COURT: I don't even like settlements.
         MR. PARKS: But the theory behind the settlement is
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    parties go at each other pretty hard for a long period of time,
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    and we sure did. In advance of the mediation, we had a lot of
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    discussions, some of them got heated, and then we had a
    mediation session that started at nine in the morning, went to
    about ten at night at which it was very adversarial. But once
    you reach that agreement, the theory ought to be we're all now
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    working together for the best interest of the class to get this
    settlement done, get it approved, and get the benefits out to
 9
    the class and do everything that we're supposed to do. And
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    that's hard if you are still sniping with each other. I
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    strongly agree with that.
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             THE COURT: The notion is you got to walk away still
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    embittered.
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             MR. PARKS: That's right.
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             THE COURT: I don't quite get that.
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             MR. PARKS: And I would have to still be standing here
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    complaining about the plaintiffs' lawyers and the amounts of
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    time they spend on different things. I agree that that's not
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    productive at this juncture or any juncture after you've
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    reached a settlement.
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             THE COURT: It's not civilized.
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             MR. PARKS: I agree.
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             THE COURT:
                        I mean, I'd much rather have a trial.
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             MR. PARKS: I'd love to try this case, Your Honor.
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    Let's do it.
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1 THE COURT: Except that that means that the litigants 2 are no longer the captains of their ships, and that I think is philosophically the counterpoint. 3 4 MR. PARKS: Correct, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: And so what I'm looking for is the -- as 6 the harbormaster, if I may, I'm going to stick with the 7 maritime metaphor a little bit, how do I guide the ship without it being, you know, the waves and the shoals and all of that 9 stuff? You ought to be able to come to a conclusion on your 10 own, but you also have to know under what terms will you 11 actually be able to achieve that, and that's what I'm searching 12 for here, help from you guys. 13 MR. PARKS: I agree. And I think as the harbormaster 14 in this scenario, Rule 23 settlement some people would say you 15 have the benefit of objectors who come forward and say there 16 are shoals or there is a rock and there is this thing, and 17 that's what Your Honor and the District Court ought to be 18 focused on is those things that get raised to your attention by 19 objectors --20 THE COURT: Well, one would say you don't need 21 objectors, the Court has the duty to the class. 22 MR. PARKS: That's correct. That's correct. But I 23 think, like I said, the way I read the Third Circuit's opinion 24 is, having received the suggestion that there was a reverter or 25 that there was a clear sailing provision, it's the District

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    Court's duty to then look into that. And I think that's the
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    thing that we can do now.
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             THE COURT: The other pejorative is to call whatever
    it is you all are doing a gimmick.
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                         I agree. That was unfortunate. In Roman
             MR. PARKS:
    times they didn't do that.
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 7
             THE COURT: Roman times it was just lions.
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             MR. PARKS: Correct. And lawyers all worked for free.
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             THE COURT: I was only going back to the 11th century.
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             MR. PARKS: Well, you'd have to go back further.
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    Roman times you'd have to go back a whole lot more centuries.
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             THE COURT: Bad news. We're not going to do that.
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             MR. PARKS: I appreciate that.
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             THE COURT: I could pass out, you know, some sort of
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    pieces of paper and you'd all have to draw what century. It
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    would be fun, though. Write a good article.
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             MR. PARKS: I have 16-year-old twins who are studying
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    world history this year. So we could assign them. They could
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    use some more homework.
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             THE COURT: Then you have to read it to them or write
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    it yourself.
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             MR. PARKS: Never.
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             THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me go back to where
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    I started. Anybody else have observations before I start
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    again? No. Okay.
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1 MR. SCHULMAN: I had a few comments. 2 THE COURT: Good. I'm sure you do.

MR. SCHULMAN: So I guess I'll begin with this idea of forced acrimony that Your Honor is resistant to. And of course we wouldn't call it forced acrimony. We call it reintroducing adversarialness. The clear sailing and kicker package together are bad because it deprives the Court of any adversarial process on the question of attorney's fees. Which in regular litigation maybe that's fine, that's good. You don't need a second major litigation if it was just bilateral litigation, but here you --

THE COURT: I don't mean to be sharp about this, but every case is special. This case is no more special than a rear-end collision. It still requires a proof of a fact. It still requires persuasion. I know that the lawyers who get involved in this kind of litigation seem to want to carve out specialness for themselves, but as far as I am concerned, the lesson I learned from a number of judges who came before me, ones there on the wall, is that every case is important to everybody. It doesn't matter.

MR. SCHULMAN: I certainly don't mean to disparage any individual case saying they're not important. All I am saying is that fees in a class action are different because there are absentees that are not in a bilateral litigation. Like in the rear-end collision, the plaintiff should be supervising their

own attorney. They can. They have a contract.

THE COURT: Unless they are a minor or an invalid or incompetent, in which case the Court is involved.

MR. SCHULMAN: Exactly. And in those situations clear sailing provisions should sound the alarm bell because it's depriving the Court of -- so in this case, obviously, we came in. We're an objector. We are not objecting in every case. There is not good objectors to come in in every case. The clear sailing provision deprives the Court of the adversarial process, the defendant's commentary on criticism of the field, the request, and I think that's exactly what the case law suggests the problem is. And so, you know, we wouldn't call it forced acrimony as much as reintroducing adversarialness. So that's point number one.

Number two is we agree with Mr. Parks in his interpretation of the Third Circuit opinion. The Third Circuit panel didn't seem to believe this Court understood that it has the ability -- that it thought that it was required to look to the amount made available rather than having the discretion to look to the amounts claimed. But the Third Circuit wasn't agnostic on that question either. There is lines in that opinion that strongly suggest this Court should look to the amounts claimed as the starting point. It said that it was the sensible starting line to begin with the award analysis. And the factors that Mr. Parks mentioned, for example, that there

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wasn't harm to the class members and so you should look to the
    amounts made available, that's completely backward. That's
    going to give the attorneys a higher fee when they are bringing
    a weaker case. It makes zero sense from a policy perspective
    why that factor should -- counseling in favor of looking to the
    amount made available.
           As far as the injunctive relief, the reason the Third
    Circuit didn't mention that is that wasn't the defense, that
    wasn't the -- that wasn't the formula that class counsel
    suggested, and that's why Your Honor had it only in a footnote.
    They specifically suggested they were being modest by not
12
    including that. They asked for the calculation based on the
13
    amounts claimed -- the amounts that were available but not
14
    claimed. They thought that was --
             THE COURT: Did you mention the injunctive relief in
    your briefing to the Third Circuit?
             MR. SCHULMAN: We did mention injunctive relief.
             THE COURT: You did?
             MR. SCHULMAN: We did mention generally the concept of
    injunctive relief settlements, which we agree can be valuable,
    but an injunctive relief --
             THE COURT: How about in this case?
             MR. SCHULMAN: In this case we do not agree that the
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    conclusion of that footnote was correct in terms of saying
    that -- so Wawa in early 2020, and Mr. Parks can correct me if
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I'm incorrect on the record, but in early 2020 their board had approved the \$35 million expenditure. It didn't come from the settlement, so the settlement makes -- puts some requirements that are enforceable, but it doesn't obligate Wawa to do anything that it wasn't already doing in terms of its data security practices. Those were voluntary decisions so that they don't --THE COURT: So what you are suggesting is that entities, whether it's an individual or a company or, you know, an association, should be obdurate as long as possible until hauled into court and made to sign on the dotted line? There 12 is very little difference from somebody who is obdurate and somebody who is adversarial and is fighting for fighting sake. 14 If somebody sees, the scales dropped from their eyes, you know, and they say, you know, we've got this problem, let's meet it, you know, before it turns into a huge problem, you're saying that's stupid. MR. SCHULMAN: I don't think that's stupid. I think that's a smart way and there is reasons that they would want to do that for -- to potentially reduce damages, to create a voluntary remedial scheme instead of making that the superior --THE COURT: I've had a number of class action 24 settlements where -- I can think of one right off the bat where there was insecticides being used and there was a very

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    proactive plan in place to make corrective action way before
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    the litigants got down and dirty to talk about dollars and
 3
    cents. There already was work being done by DuPont to correct
    it. You're saying that DuPont should get no benefits from
    having anticipated and reduced damages and save the
    environment, save the trees.
 6
 7
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, that can lay the foundation
 8
    for --
 9
             THE COURT: But you're saying they don't get any
10
    benefit from it because they did it too early.
11
             MR. SCHULMAN: I don't think the settlement gets
12
    credit for it, but DuPont might use that to prevent
13
    certification of the class, that that might be a superior
14
    remedial measure.
15
             THE COURT: All right. This is not going to be a
16
    productive avenue to discuss. I'm going back to my plaintive
17
    reply. What am I supposed to do, do you think, now?
18
             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, they can submit declarations.
19
    don't think that gets to the fundamental -- we think that the
20
    Third Circuit opinion is best read to have the Court reconsider
21
    its conclusion that it's better to look at the amount made
22
    available rather than the amount claimed. We think there is
23
    strong suggestion in that opinion that that's the more sensible
24
    approach.
25
             THE COURT: How do I figure that out?
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MR. SCHULMAN: Just a fair reading of -- so the Third Circuit itself laid out certain factors why it might consider it. For example, it suggested that the fact that the relief was gift cards rather than cash could counsel in favor of looking at the amounts claimed rather than the amounts redeemed. So we didn't argue the -- there is a federal law, the Class Action Fairness Act, that actually governs coupons. We felt like the --THE COURT: Gift cards are not coupons. MR. SCHULMAN: Right. We felt that the declaration --THE COURT: Trust me. I've spent a lot of years on this issue. The standing committee on the rules and the advisory committee on the civil rules and Judge Dow, Bob Dow, from the Northern District of Illinois spent a great deal of time working on Rule 23. And I know precisely what he worked on, so I'm not a neophyte on this. MR. SCHULMAN: Sure. And we haven't raised the CAFA coupon issue before Your Honor, but we do think it's a factor that should be weighted in the analysis for whether Your Honor is going to look to the amounts claimed or the amounts made available. The fact is, when they get the coupon, there is another step -- the gift card rather, the electronic gift card, there is another step that needs to be taken before they can realize the value. THE COURT: When the class is an indefinite class like

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    this, there is no way to identify this class of people --
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             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, they've tried to do that with the
 3
    loyalty system.
             THE COURT: But it cannot be done. You cannot know
 4
 5
    for certain who could be within these classes.
 6
             MR. SCHULMAN: Without them stepping forward.
 7
             THE COURT: Well, and then do what? I mean, how do
    you know? Would you -- like you want the plaintiffs' lawyers
 9
    here to sign an oath. Would you have every customer of Wawa
10
    come in and sign an oath?
11
             MR. SCHULMAN: When they submitted claims, they had
12
    to. There was an averment on that claim form. Now, I quess
13
    they don't require that of the loyalty members that they are
14
    sending out.
15
             THE COURT: My point here is that there is a
16
    practicality quotient, and I'm going to just return to this
17
    melody: What is it that you think needs to be done?
             MR. SCHULMAN: We think the fee award needs to be
18
19
    assessed --
20
             THE COURT: How do I do that? Let's try it that way.
21
             MR. SCHULMAN: In light of the amounts made available
22
    is the fundamental focus the Third Circuit decision cites --
23
             THE COURT: When you say "the amount made
24
    available" --
25
             MR. SCHULMAN: No, no, I'm sorry. If I said the
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1
    amounts made available, I misspoke and meant the amount
 2
    claimed. I apologize. It's been a long day. A long trip up.
 3
             THE COURT: What point is it for the amount claimed?
 4
    What's the point?
 5
             MR. SCHULMAN: The point in time? At the end of the
 6
    claims process, which now is complete. And that's why the
 7
    Third Circuit has language about deferring the fee award
    pending the results of that claims process. That's what the
 9
    Beatty Products [ph] decision was as well.
10
           There is a few more things I wanted to mention, just two
11
    more. Ms. Savett tried to characterize the third amendment as
12
    a clarification. I don't think Your Honor actually agrees with
13
    that, that the Third Amended Agreement was only a
14
    clarification, that it wasn't doing something new. I don't
15
    think Your Honor agrees with that and the Third Circuit
16
    certainly did not find that, so it's precluded by the Third
17
    Circuit's mandate in the panel opinion.
18
           And lastly, if Your Honor would like, we'd be able to
19
    draft a proposed order and submit it to the Court.
20
             THE COURT: You are going to draft one? You are going
21
    to do one in a group? I don't want competing draft orders,
22
    frankly. I don't find that to be helpful. And I don't know
23
    that it would be productive for me to encourage you all to work
24
    together since you're supposed to all be at each other's
25
    throats. Which way do you want to go?
                  -United States District Court
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             MR. SCHULMAN: Well, we're happy to continue our
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    dialogue with them. I don't know where they are right now.
 3
             THE COURT: Right there.
 4
             MR. SCHULMAN: Yes. Literally there, right there.
 5
             THE COURT: Literally what you want is you want them
 6
    to take less money. Isn't that it?
 7
             MR. SCHULMAN: We think that a fair --
 8
             THE COURT: What happens to the money? Goes back to
 9
    Wawa?
10
             MR. SCHULMAN: No. It goes to the class members so
11
    that they get larger gift cards. That's the Third Amended
12
    Settlement. That's why we withdraw our objection to the
13
    settlement.
14
             THE COURT: How much of a haircut do you want then?
15
    want this out on the table.
16
             MR. SCHULMAN: Okay.
17
             THE COURT: I'm tired of all this hiding behind
18
    verbiage.
19
             MR. SCHULMAN: So our last position in the papers is
20
    25 percent of the amounts claimed, which is 1.55 million.
21
    We've made an offer to them. Would you like to know that
22
    amount?
23
             THE COURT: Do they know that?
24
             MR. SCHULMAN: They know that.
25
             THE COURT: Have you guys responded?
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1
             MS. LIEBENBERG:
                              No.
 2
             THE COURT: When can you respond to them?
 3
             MS. SAVETT: We rejected it.
 4
             THE COURT: I guess you have the time.
 5
             MS. LIEBENBERG: We haven't told them that.
 6
             MS. SAVETT: But I think it is important while you're
 7
    questioning that the amounts be put on the table so you
 8
    understand what kind of cut he's speaking about.
 9
             THE COURT: Well, what I want to know is -- I'm back
10
    to my use of the two principals, one is 1-e and one is a-1.
11
    I'm more interested in principles, l-e, and I'm hearing that
12
    the objectors -- the objector is more interested in a-1, which
13
    I imagine.
14
             MR. SCHULMAN: I would disagree with that
15
    characterization. The only offer we've made -- our principal
16
    is that the fee should be based on the amounts claimed.
    shouldn't be based on fictional amounts made available.
17
18
    offer is consistent with that.
19
             THE COURT: You are making a demand, not an offer.
20
             MR. SCHULMAN: It's not a demand. It was an offer.
21
    It was an offer. It wasn't a demand. It wasn't a
2.2
    take-it-or-leave-it. It was an offer.
23
             THE COURT: We'll compromise on suggestion. How is
24
    that?
25
             MR. SCHULMAN: Fair enough.
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Well, our suggestion would put the ratio back into proportion. That was the problem. Under the fee award it was going to be the class counsel was going to get 3 million and the class was going to get less than that. Our suggestion would put the ratio back into harmony.

THE COURT: Does anybody think you're able to work together to come up with a proposed agenda for my asking you all to give me more information on which I can then make additional findings?

MS. SAVETT: I think we could do that. We could prepare -- we could each say what factual points we want to make in a declaration.

I just want to take issue with his statement that the money available to the class was fictional. It was not fictional. It was there for the class to claim. And there is quite a lot of law talking about why it's more important to accept the approach of money available, because a lot of times class members won't bother to make small claims, but you have to give them the ability to. And also, it's just discouraging class actions in general. One of the main points of class actions is to be able to represent people who do have small claims because they couldn't otherwise be represented.

So I think Your Honor -- we know Your Honor, if you were to get some additional facts from each side, could pick which approach you think makes the most sense in this case, the

actual claims made or the money available, and you could come up with some valuation of the benefit of the injunctive relief, and you could lay out your reasonableness factors which, quite frankly, we, on our side, thought you did a really good, thorough job the first time, but you would have more facts this time, and you can decide whether you think there was actually a kicker or whether it was all very innocent and done honestly and not collusively, and I think you could write a new opinion.

I don't see how we are going to agree with him. He wants us to take a drastic cut to an amount that already is quite negative for us in a case we worked hard and we got a significant benefit. And more than anything we want the class to get this benefit, because two years have gone by and they still didn't get their gift cards, and we can't get the money out to the class. And there is one objector, one objector out of 22 million people, that objected to this fee. And, of course, I think that's at least one of 20 reasonableness factors that the Court might consider.

But I don't really think that we can work this out right now. He's been steady that he thinks the Court makes a per se rule that you have to accept in this case the actual claims made, and we think the Court of Appeals, that's one thing they gave you complete discretion on. They said either way could work, just come up with a reasonableness analysis.

THE COURT: So here is what we're going to do. To be

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true to my own view of what you lawyers should be doing, I don't want to force you to try and work together because that seems to be not in keeping with what somebody wants to establish here. So you can each have two weeks to submit to me whatever additional factual information you think the Court needs or must have pursuant to the Third Circuit's opinion or any gaps that you find in the original approval papers that I issued. And then I will invite you probably in January to come if there is going to be any very brief oral argument. like to have there be no more oral argument, however, and I really do not need more legal briefs telling me what some other circuit someplace else may have established. I believe every case is unique. I'm not in the cookie cutter business. don't care what kind of a case it is. Every case is unique. This one is unique. It is special. Everybody is special. Every snowflake is special.

And you all have done a fine job, as has the circuit, in trying to be a conscientious gatekeeper or teacher, whatever, and I appreciate all of the input from the circuit and from all of you lawyers. And I will appreciate in two weeks getting whatever additional material you think the Court needs in order to address again the settlement, as all will describe it. And if there are gaps as a result of what you send to me, then I'll get back to you.

I mean, right now my sense is I would rather not have

more argument, but depending on what you give me. To the extent you can affirm that you've discussed any of this with each other, that would be helpful, but I'm not requiring that. And I am, frankly, dubious about there being any secret sauce anywhere or secret formula that would work magically here, and that's because I do think each case is separate.

But to put this in simple terms, I would actually, you know, show your work -- going back to homework -- where you say this is what the settlement is, this is what the component parts are, you know, this was the time line, this is what we did, this is who we worked on the settlement, this is how many hours we spent with the mediator, you know. Just go back and do it in words of one syllable. And I'll work with that. But I want there to be inclusion of injunctive relief and nonmonetary relief.

I also want somebody to -- and I know there are people who do this sort of thing, but I always want a computation of the time value of the money, how much has the class lost as a result of this process. I'm going to plug that into the decision of showing the net result of this concern. Because that's part of the practical feature of what's happened.

Anybody else have anything to offer?

MR. PARKS: Your Honor, again, Greg Parks for Wawa. Separate from the consumer track, there is the financial institutions track on which we had a settlement. We were

poised to send out notice about that settlement when the Third Circuit panel opinion came down, and we came to Your Honor and said we think we should stay that. I don't know if Your Honor wants to wait until after we've concluded this briefing to then address --

THE COURT: I frankly think it's a very different kettle of fish. Do you think that that cannot go forward on its own?

MR. PARKS: I think there are a few changes we'd have to make. Because it's clear from the Third Circuit's opinion that Your Honor at least has to have the information about the claims made in order to make the final determination, and I think the way we had that structured the claims deadline was after the final approval hearing, so we've got to change that, and that requires a change to the notice, which was one of the exhibits that Your Honor previously approved that we would have to now get reapproved.

We can do that now -- and I've talked with the leaders of the financial institution track -- and we're prepared to do that in two or three weeks, as Your Honor suggested. Or if Your Honor wanted to wait to sort out the consumer track first and then get the financial track, we can probably do that as well.

THE COURT: Well, let's see if you can do it on its own in a few weeks. I think you probably can do that. Is that

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1
    okay?
 2
             MR. PARKS: Yes.
 3
             THE COURT: I would just assume let that have its own
    life.
 5
             MR. PARKS: All right.
 6
             THE COURT: Because I think it can have its own life.
 7
             MR. PARKS: Strongly agree with that. I know
    financial institution counsel agrees with that as well.
 9
             THE COURT: Where are we on the employee track?
10
             MR. PARKS: We have settled, Your Honor, on an
11
    individual basis. The stipulation of dismissal has been
12
    submitted. That case is over and done, done, done I am
13
    ecstatic to say.
14
             THE COURT: Done, done. D-U-N or D-O-N-E?
15
             MR. PARKS: Both, Your Honor. All of the above.
16
    Done, done, done, Mr. Haviland is not here today.
17
             THE COURT: Well, send him a card.
18
             MR. PARKS: I sure will.
19
             THE COURT: All right. Anything else from anybody?
20
             MS. SAVETT: No, Your Honor.
21
             MS. LIEBENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
22
             MR. PARKS: No, Your Honor.
23
             THE COURT: Fine. Adjourned. Bye.
24
             (Proceeding concluded at 4:28 p.m.)
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           I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
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    from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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    /s/ Cherilyn M. McCollum
 5
    Cherilyn M. McCollum, CCR, RPR
    Official Court Reporter
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    Date: 7th day of December, 2023
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                   -United States District Court-\!-\!-
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